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Abstract This paper extends the concepts of proper equilibria, protective behavior
and prudent behavior to multicriteria games. Three types of proper equilibria based
on different types of domination are introduced. It is shown that protective behavior
coincides with prudent behavior. Possible relations and existence are analyzed.
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1 Introduction
Agents involved in competitive, interactive decision-making processes usually take
into account various objectives. In these circumstances, the decision process can be
modelled as a multicriteria game.
Multicriteria games have been introduced in [1], where repeated zero-sum games
with vector payoffs are analyzed and an analog of the minimax theorem is derived.
The notion of equilibrium, which in this setting is referred to as Pareto equilibrium,
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has been introduced in [2]. Pareto equilibria can be characterized as Nash equilibria
(see [3]) of so called tradeoff (unicriterion) games, where each agent’s payoff is ob-
tained by a scalarization of his payoff in each objective with nonnegative weights.
In [4], this result is extended to strong Pareto equilibria and positive weights. In [5],
solutions for multicriteria games have been obtained by means of analyzing proper
efficient solutions of corresponding vector maximization problems. In the case of
two-person multicriteria games, the set of solutions equals the set of Pareto equilibria
as a consequence of the Geoffrion representation theorem (see [6]).
As far as we know, little attention has been devoted to refining the set of Pareto
equilibria for multicriteria games based on ideas similar to the refinements of Nash
equilibria for unicriterion games. Based on the ideas behind the concept of perfect
Nash equilibrium as considered in [7, 8] proposed the concept of perfect equilibrium
as a refinement of the set of Pareto equilibria. Explicitly considering the possibility to
order the strategies of each player by means of levels of best reply sets, [8] also hinted
at an extension of the concept of proper equilibria (see [9]) to a multicriteria setting.
In this paper, we analyze three extensions of the notion of proper equilibria based
on different types of domination to two-person multicriteria games. These types are
based on pure domination (or vector domination) and two forms of level domination,
in which the strategies are divided in different levels of best replies. It is seen that the
set of proper equilibria based on pure domination contains the set of proper equilibria
of tradeoff games as a subset. Furthermore, it contains the sets of proper equilibria
based on level domination. The extensions are illustrated by means of an example,
clarifying the differences between the three types of domination.
Furthermore, we study an extension of the protective and prudent behavior to two-
person multicriteria games. Basically, protective and prudent strategies of a player
deal with the (lexicographic) maximization of his worst possible payoff with respect
to all the pure strategies of the other player. The two concepts differ in the case of
inconclusiveness. A protective strategy then also searches for minimality in terms of
inclusion of the sets of pure strategies which give rise to this worst payoff, whereas
a prudent strategy aims of minimizing the cardinality of the set of pure strategies
causing this worst payoff. We show that the protective behavior coincides with the
prudent behavior and prove existence. Two examples illustrate some special aspects
of protective behavior in a zero-sum like multicriteria environment and in particu-
lar highlight the difference with proper equilibria. One might have expected such a
relationship on the basis of [10], which studies protective and prudent behavior in
unicriterion games. It proves that, for matrix games, the set of protective equilibria
coincides with the set of proper equilibria.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the necessary definitions on
two-person multicriteria games, Pareto equilibria, and efficient pure best reply sets.
It also includes the correspondence between Pareto equilibria and Nash equilibria
of the tradeoff games, and the characterization of the carriers of best reply strate-
gies as a subset of efficient best reply sets. In Sect. 3, we introduce the notions of
pure domination proper equilibrium, level domination proper equilibrium, and level
proper equilibrium. An example illustrates these concepts and clarifies the differ-
ences among them. We prove the existence of pure domination proper equilibrium
for any multicriteria game. In Sect. 4, we propose an extension of protective and
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prudent behavior to multicriteria games. We show that protective behavior coincides
with prudent behavior, and prove existence. Two examples illustrate some aspects of
protective behavior in a zero-sum like environment.
2 Preliminaries: Multicriteria Games
We consider mixed extensions of two-person finite strategic multicriteria games, in
which player one can choose between m and player two between n pure strategies.
The sets {e1, . . . , em} and {f1, . . . , fn} contain the pure strategies of player one and
two respectively. Player one and two take into account r and s criteria respectively.
Let A = (A1, . . . ,Ar) and B = (B1, . . . ,Bs) be two vectors of real valued m × n
matrices in which the rows correspond to pure strategies e1, . . . , em and the columns
to pure strategies f1, . . . , fn. The matrix At (Bt ) can be interpreted as the payoff
matrix of player one (two) with respect to criterium t . A two-person multicriteria
game can then be described by a tuple  = 〈m,n,u1, u2〉. Here m, a short-
hand for {e1, . . . , em}, denotes the set of all mixed strategies of player one and n
(= {f1, . . . , fn}) is the set of all mixed strategies of player two. The (relative) in-
terior of e.g. m is denoted by ˚m: it represents the set of all completely mixed
strategies. The functions u1 and u2 are the (vector) payoff functions of player one
and two. For all (p, q) ∈ m × n
u1(p, q) = (pA1q, . . . ,pArq), u2(p, q) = (pB1q, . . . ,pBsq),
or, in short notation,
u1(p, q) = pAq, u2(p, q) = pBq.
We will usually describe a two-person multicriteria game by the tuple  =
〈m,n,A,B〉. The set of all r × s multicriteria games of this type is denoted by
MG(r × s,m × n).
The (Pareto) equilibria of multicriteria games can be described by the notion of
best reply functions. Take strategies p ∈ m and q ∈ n. Then p is a best reply to q
(p ∈ B1(, q)) if there is no strategy p¯ ∈ m such that pAq < p¯Aq (i.e. (pAq)t <
(p¯Aq)t for all t ∈ {1, . . . r}). Similarly q is a best reply to p (q ∈ B2(,p)) if there
is no strategy q¯ ∈ n such that pBq < pBq¯ . The strategy combination (p, q) is an
equilibrium of  if p is a best reply to q and q is a best reply to p. The set of all
equilibria of  is denoted by E().
There is a direct connection between multicriteria games and their corresponding
tradeoff games in which the various criteria of each player are weighted.
Definition 2.1 Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 ∈ MG(r × s,m× n) be a two-person multi-
criteria game and let λ1 ∈ r , λ2 ∈ s be tradeoff (or weight) vectors for player one
and two respectively. Denote λ = (λ1, λ2). The unicriterion game (λ) is defined as
the bimatrix game with mixed strategy spaces m and n and m×n payoff matrices




(λ1)t (At )ij and B(λ2)ij =
s∑
t=1
(λ2)t (Bt )ij .
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The set of all Nash equilibria of the bimatrix game (λ) is denoted by NE((λ)).
The following theorem states that each equilibrium of a multicriteria game  can
be found as a Nash equilibrium of an unicriterion game, derived from  by using a
suitable tradeoff vector.
Theorem 2.1 (Shapley, [2]) Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. Then,
E() = {(p, q) ∈ m × n | (p, q) ∈ NE((λ)) for some λ ∈ r × s)}.
Reference [8] provides a characterization of (Pareto) equilibria points in terms of
carriers and efficient best reply sets. Let (p, q) ∈ m × n. The carrier of p with
respect to  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 is defined as C(,p) := {i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} | pi > 0}.
I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} is efficient for player one with respect to q in  if for all strategies p ∈
m with C(,p) ⊆ I it holds that pAq is undominated in the polytope P1(, q) :=
conv{eiAq | i ∈ {1, . . .m}} ⊂ Rr of all possible payoff vectors with respect to q .
Note that if I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} is efficient, then each subset K ⊆ I is efficient too. I ⊆
{1, . . . ,m} is an efficient pure best reply set for player one with respect to q in  if I is
efficient with respect to q in  and there does not exist an efficient set K ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}
such that I ⊆ K and I = K . The set of all efficient pure best reply sets of player one
with respect to q in  is denoted by E1(, q). In the same way one can define efficient
sets and efficient pure best reply sets for player two. The following theorem shows
the connection between best replies and efficient pure best reply sets.
Theorem 2.2 (Borm et al. [8]) Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game
and (p, q) ∈ m × n. Then, p ∈ B1(, q) if and only if C(,p) ⊆ I for some
I ∈ E1(, q) and q ∈ B2(,p) if and only if C(,q) ⊆ J for some J ∈ E2(,p).
3 Proper Equilibria
In this section, we introduce three types of proper equilibria of multicriteria games.
Reference [8] introduces perfect equilibria of multicriteria games, generalizing the
notion of perfect Nash equilibria introduced by [7]. Take ε > 0. A strategy combina-
tion (p, q) ∈ ˚m × ˚n is called an ε-perfect pair if there exists an I ∈ E1(, q) and
an J ∈ E2(,p) such that pi ≤ ε, for all i ∈ I and qj ≤ ε for all j ∈ J .
Definition 3.1 Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a two-person multicriteria game. A strat-
egy combination (p, q) is a perfect equilibrium of  if there exists a sequence
{εt }∞t=1 ⊂ (0,∞) converging to zero and a sequence {(pt , qt )}∞t=1 ⊂ ˚m × ˚n con-
verging to (p, q), such that (pt , qt ) is an εt -perfect pair for all t .
Another refinement of Nash equilibria are the proper equilibria, introduced in [9].
Let  = (m,n,A,B) be an m × n bimatrix game, i.e.  ∈ MG(1 × 1,m × n).
Take ε ∈ (0,1). Then, a strategy combination (p, q) ∈ ˚m × ˚n is an ε-proper pair
if, for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
eiAq < ekAq ⇒ pi ≤ εpk,
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pBfj < pBfl ⇒ qj ≤ εql.
A strategy combination (p, q) ∈ m ×n is a proper equilibrium of  if there exist a
sequence {εt }∞t=1 of positive numbers converging to zero and a sequence {(pt , qt )}∞t=1
of completely mixed strategy combinations converging to (p, q) such that (pt , qt ) is
an εt -proper pair for all t ∈ N. The set of all proper equilibria of  is denoted by
PR().
The idea behind proper equilibria is that costly mistakes occur with relatively
smaller probabilities than less costly mistakes, whereas in perfect equilibria mistakes
are not compared at all. Note that in unicriterion games any two pure strategies can be
mutually compared and as a consequence the set of pure strategies can be partitioned
into well-defined levels of quality, given a strategy of the opponent. In a multicriteria
environment we do not have this completeness and there are several options on how
to deal with this. We introduce three types of proper equilibria in multicriteria games
each based on another way of comparing pure strategies. To do so, we first introduce
some terminology.
Let
 = 〈m,n,A,B〉 ∈ MG(r × s,m × n)
and take q ∈ n. The first level of best replies of player one against q is the set of all
pure strategies contained in some efficient pure best reply sets with respect to q . The
t’th level of best replies is constructed by considering the best replies with respect to
q taking into account all strategies that are not in the first t − 1 levels. Formally this
boils down to the following definition:
M1(q) := {1, . . . ,m}, m1(q) := m,
11(q) :=  = 〈m,n,A,B〉,
E 11 (, q) := E1(11(q), q),
L11(q) := {i ∈ M1(q) | i ∈ I for some I ∈ E 11 (, q)},
recursively, for each t ∈ N, t ≥ 2:
Mt(q) := Mt−1(q)\Lt−11 (q), mt (q) := |Mt(q)|,
t1(q) := 〈mt(q),n,At ,Bt 〉,
E t1(, q) := E1(t1(q), q),
Lt1(q) := {i ∈ Mt(q) | i ∈ I for some I ∈ E t1(, q)}.
Here, mt(q) = ({ei}i∈Mt(q)) is the restricted mixed strategy space and At and Bt
are the corresponding vectors of mt(q) × n submatrices of the vectors of matrices A
and B corresponding to the rows in Mt(q). Note that there is an unique z ∈ N such
that Mz−1(q) = ∅ and Mz(q) = ∅. In the same way, one can define Nt(p), nt (p),
t2(p), E t2(,p) and Lt2(p) for p ∈ m.
Let ε ∈ (0,1) and  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. The completely
mixed strategy combination (p, q) ∈ ˚m × ˚n is
• a pure domination ε-proper pair of  if, for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that eiAq <
ekAq , it holds that pi ≤ εpk and if, for all j, l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that pBfj < pBfl ,
it holds that qj ≤ εql .
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• a level domination ε-proper pair if for all i ∈ Lt1(q): if there is a p¯ ∈ m and
I ∈ E t−11 (, q) with C(p¯) ⊆ I such that eiAq ≤ p¯Aq , then pi ≤ εpk for all k ∈ I
and if for all j ∈ Lt2(p): if there is a q¯ ∈ n and J ∈ E t−12 (,p) with C(q¯) ⊆ J
such that pBfj ≤ pBq¯ , then qj ≤ εql for all l ∈ J .
• a level ε-proper pair if for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}: if i ∈ Lt1(q) and k ∈ Lt−11 (q),
then pi ≤ εpk and if for all j, l ∈ {1, . . . , n}: if j ∈ Lt2(p) and l ∈ Lt−12 (p), then
qj ≤ εql .
We now introduce three types of proper equilibria in multicriteria games. The dif-
ference between the three types of proper equilibria are due to the different notions of
domination between pure strategies used. The first type of proper equilibria is based
on standard vector domination in all coordinates (criteria), this leads to pure domina-
tion proper equilibria. In the second type of domination a strategy ei dominates ek , if
ei is contained in an efficient pure best reply set of a lower level such that there exist
a mixed strategy (with carrier within this pure best reply set) such that ek is domi-
nated in all coordinates by this mixed strategy. This second type of proper equilibria
is called level domination proper equilibria. Finally, in the third type of domination
a strategy of a higher level is dominated by all strategies of lower levels. This leads
to level proper equilibria. Note that in unicriterion games all three concepts of domi-
nation coincide. The idea of level proper equilibria is shortly mentioned in [8].
Definition 3.2 Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. The strategy com-
bination (p, q) ∈ m × n is a pure domination proper equilibrium of  if (p, q)
is a perfect equilibrium of  and there exists a sequence {εt }∞t=1 ⊂ (0,1) converg-
ing to zero and a sequence {(pt , qt )}∞t=1 ⊂ ˚m × ˚n converging to (p, q), such that
(pt , qt ) is a dominated εt -proper pair for all t . Similarly the strategy combination
(p, q) ∈ m × n is a level domination proper (level proper) equilibrium of  if
(p, q) is a perfect equilibrium of  and there exists a sequence {εt }∞t=1 ⊂ (0,1) con-
verging to zero and a sequence {(pt , qt )}∞t=1 ∈ ˚m × ˚n converging to (p, q), such
that (pt , qt ) is a level domination (level proper) εt -proper pair for all t .
The set of pure domination proper equilibria of a multicriteria game  is denoted
by PDP(). The sets of level domination proper equilibria and level proper equilib-
ria are denoted by LDP() and LP() respectively.
Proposition 3.1 Let  be a multicriteria game. Then, LP() ⊆ LDP() ⊆
PDP().
Proof It suffices to note that each level ε-proper pair is a level domination ε-proper
pair and each level domination ε-proper pair is a pure domination ε-proper pair. 
In the following theorem it is shown that the set of pure domination proper equi-
libria contains the set of proper equilibria of all tradeoff games.
Theorem 3.1 Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. Then, we have that
{(p, q) ∈ m × n | ∃λ ∈ r × s : (p, q) ∈ PR((λ))} ⊆ PDP().
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Proof Let
λ = (λ1, λ2) ∈ r × s and (p, q) ∈ PR((λ)).
We first show that (p, q) ∈ PE(). This follows immediately from Theorem 5.3
in [8] and the fact that in unicriterion games the set of proper equilibria is contained
in the set of perfect equilibria.
Furthermore, since (p, q) is a proper equilibrium in the unicriterion game (λ),
there exist sequences {εt }∞t=1 ⊂ (0,1) and {(pt , qt )}∞t=1 ⊂ ˚m × ˚n such that
limt→∞ εt = 0 and limk→∞(pt , qt ) = (p, q) and (pt , qt ) is εt -proper in (λ) for




Clearly, we are finished if we can show that pti ≤ εtptk .













From the fact that (pt , qt ) is εt -proper in (λ), it then follows that
pti ≤ εtptk. 
Now the existence of pure domination proper equilibria follows easily from the
existence of proper equilibria in unicriterion games as proved in [9]:
Corollary 3.1 For every multicriteria game, the set of pure domination proper equi-
libria is nonempty.1
The following example illustrates the differences between the three concepts of
properness.
Example 3.1 Consider a (2 × 1,5 × 4) multicriteria game  with payoff matrix A




(2,3) (2,3) (2,3) (2,3)
(0,3) (0,3) (0,3) (0,3)
(6,0) (6,0) (6,0) (6,0)
(3,2) (3,2) (3,2) (3,2)




1We conjecture that the sets of level domination proper and level proper equilibria are nonempty as well.
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Fig. 1 Possible payoff vectors
of player one (independent of





1 1 1 1
2 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
0 2 2 0




respectively. Note that the vector payoff of player one is independent of the strategy
chosen by player two. The set of possible payoff vectors of player one, conv{eiAq |
i ∈ {1, . . . ,5}}, does not depend on q and is drawn in Fig. 1. From this figure it is
immediately clear that for all q ∈ 4 the set of first level efficient pure best reply sets
is given by E 11 (, q) = {{1,2}, {1,3}}, second, that E 21 (, q) = {{4}} and E 31 (, q) ={{5}}. It can be verified easily that the set of perfect equilibria equals the set of Nash
equilibria
E() = conv{e1, e3} × conv{f1, f2, f4} ∪ conv{e1, e2} × {f1}
∪ {e1} × conv{f1, f2, f3, f4}
= PE().
To find all pure domination proper equilibria, note that the strategy e5 of player one is
purely dominated by e4. Let ε > 0 and (p, q) a pure domination ε-proper pair. Then
it holds that f4 is dominated by at least one strategy: pBf1 > pBf4 or pBf2 > pBf4,
(or both), from which it follows that for a pure domination proper equilibrium (p, q)
it holds that q4 = 0. By choosing suitable sequences, one can show that all remaining
equilibria are pure domination proper. Therefore, the set of all pure domination proper
equilibria equals
PDP() = conv{e1, e3} × conv{f1, f2}
∪ conv{e1, e2} × {f1}
∪ {e1} × conv{f1, f2, f3}.
To find all level domination proper equilibria, note that for all q ∈ 4, e4 is domi-
nated by p¯ = 710e1 + 310e3 and the carrier of p¯ equals {1,3}. Hence, if (p, q) is a level
domination ε-proper pair, then it holds that p5 ≤ εp4, p4 ≤ εp1, p4 ≤ εp3. It follows
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that pBf3 ≤ pBf1 for small ε. If p2 = p4, both f1 and f2 are best replies. The set of
level domination proper equilibria becomes
LDP() = conv{e1, e3} × conv{f1, f2}
∪ conv{e1, e2} × {f1}
∪ {e1} × conv{f1, f2}.
Suppose that (p, q) is a level ε-proper pair. Then, the following inequalities are
true p5 ≤ εp4 and p4 ≤ εpk , with k ∈ {1,2,3}. Consequently,
pBf2 < pBf1, pBf3 < pBf1, pBf4 < pBf1
and the set of level proper equilibria is given by
LP() = conv{e1, e3} × {f1} ∪ conv{e1, e2} × {f1}.
4 Protective Behavior
Protective and prudent strategies for mixed extensions of finite games are introduced
in [10]. Generally speaking a protective strategy of a player maximizes his worst
possible payoff with respect to all pure strategy combinations of the other players.
In case of inconclusiveness it also searches for minimality in terms of inclusion of
the sets of pure strategy combinations which give rise to this worst payoff. A prudent
strategy also maximizes the worst possible payoff with respect to all pure strategy
combinations of the other players, but on the secondary level it aims to minimize the
cardinality of the sets of pure strategy combinations causing this worst payoff.
Reference [10] shows that the notions of prudent and protective are in fact equiv-
alent and prove existence. Moreover, it turns out that for matrix games the set of
protective strategy combinations coincides with the set of proper equilibria.
In this section, we introduce protective and prudent strategies for our setting of
(two-person) multicriteria games. The equivalence of protective and prudent strate-
gies is shown and existence is proved. By means of an example we show that even for
zero-sum like games protective strategy combinations need not be Pareto equilibria.
Let θ : Ru → Ru be the map that assigns to any z ∈ Ru the vector θ(z) which
orders the coordinates of z in a weakly increasing order.
Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. Let p¯ ∈ m. The pure strategies
of player 2 are compared on the basis of a worst case scenario taking all criteria
into account with equal importance. Hence the payoffs corresponding to the several
criteria are ordered in a weakly increasing order and then compared by using the
lexicographic ordering (L). Recursively, we define the vector at (p¯) ∈ Rr and the
sets Zt(p¯) and J t (p¯) by
(i) for t = 1,
Z1(p¯) = {z ∈ Rr | there is a k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that p¯Afk = z
and such that θ(p¯Afk) L θ(p¯Afj ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}},
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a1(p¯) = 2 θ(z), for all z ∈ Z1(p¯),
J 1(p¯) = {j ∈ {1, . . . , n} | p¯Afj ∈ Z1(p¯)}.
(ii) for t > 1,
Zt(p¯) =
{
z ∈ Rr | there is a k ∈ {1, . . . , n}\
t−1⋃
l=1
J l(p¯) such that
p¯Afk = z and such that θ(p¯Afk) L θ(p¯Afj ) for all






at (p¯) = θ(z), for all z ∈ Zt(p¯),
J t (p¯) = {j ∈ {1, . . . , n} | p¯Afj ∈ Zt(p¯)}.
If Zt(p¯) = ∅, then J t (p¯) = ∅ and we define at (p¯) = (∞, . . . ,∞). Similarly one can
define the vector bt (q¯) ∈ Rs and the sets Zt(q¯) and I t (q¯).
Definition 4.1 Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. Let p¯,p ∈ m. We
say that p¯ protectively dominates p, in notation, p¯ pro p, if there exists an l ∈ N
such that
(i) at (p¯) = at (p) and J t (p¯) = J t (p) for all t ∈ N, t < l,
(ii) al(p¯) L al(p) or, both al(p¯) = al(p) and J l(p¯)  J l(p).
A mixed strategy p ∈ m is called protective for player 1 in  if there does not
exist a mixed strategy p¯ ∈ m such that p¯ pro p. In a similar way, one can define
protective strategies for player 2.
Even though the protective dominance relation need not to be complete, the next
lemma reveals that a protective strategy is dominant, up to payoff equivalence, with
respect to the relation pro. Here, two strategies are payoff equivalent if they yield
the same payoff with respect to all criteria and all pure strategies of the other player.
For this we first need a technical lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. Consider p¯,p ∈ m
and define pˆ = αp¯ + (1 − α)p for some α ∈ (0,1). Moreover, let j ∈ {1, . . . , n} be
such that p¯Afj = pAfj . Then,
either θ(pˆAfj ) L θ(p¯Afj ) or θ(pˆAfj ) L θ(pAfj ).
Proof Let d ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Then,
(pˆAfj )d = α(p¯Afj )d + (1 − α)(pAfj )d
2Note that this vector is well-defined since the lexicographic minimum within the ordered sets is unique.
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and hence,
(pˆAfj )d = (p¯Afj )d = (pAfj )d, if (p¯Afj )d = (pAfj )d, (1)
(pˆAfj )d > min{(p¯Afj )d, (pAfj )d}, if (p¯Afj )d = (pAfj )d . (2)
Let σ¯ be an ordering of the criteria such that (p¯Afj )σ¯ (u) = (θ(p¯Afj ))u for all
u ∈ {1, . . . , r} and σ¯ (u) < σ¯ (v) whenever (θ(p¯Afj ))u = (θ(p¯Afj ))v and u < v. In
a similar way one can define σ which gives an ordering of the criteria based on
θ(pAfj ).
If σ¯ and σ are equal, then θ(pˆAfj ) = αθ(p¯Afj ) + (1 − α)θ(pAfj ). Since p¯Afj =
pAfj , we can assume without loss of generality that θ(p¯Afj )) L θ(pAfj ). De-
fine v as the smallest number such that (θ(p¯Afj ))v = (θ(pAfj ))v . Then (1) is valid
for all criteria σ(l) with l < v. Inequality (2) is true for d = σ(v), implying that
(pˆAfj )σ(v) > (pAfj )σ(v). For all l > v: (p¯Afj )σ(l) ≥ (p¯Afj )σ(v) > (pAfj )σ(v), to-
gether with (pAfj )σ(l) ≥ (pAfj )σ(v), this indicates that (pˆAfj )σ(l) > (pAfj )σ(v). It
can be concluded that θ(pˆAfj ) L θ(pAfj ).
Assume that σ¯ and σ are not equal. Let u be the smallest number such that σ¯ (u) =
σ(u). There are two cases.
In the first case (θ(p¯Afj ))l = (θ(pAfj ))l for all l ∈ {1, l . . . , u} and hence (1) is
valid for all l ∈ {1, . . . , u − 1}, implying that
(pˆAfj )σ(l) = (p¯Afj )σ(l) = (pAfj )σ(l) (3)
for all l ∈ {1, . . . , u − 1}. Without loss of generality we assume that σ(u) < σ¯ (u). It
follows from the definition of σ and σ¯ that (p¯Afj )σ(u) > (pAfj )σ(u). Using inequal-
ity (2), we find that
(pˆAfj )σ(u) > (pAfj )σ(u). (4)
For all l > u, it is true that (p¯Afj )σ(l) ≥ (θ(p¯Afj ))u = (θ(pAfj ))u and (pAfj )σ(l) ≥
(θ(pAfj ))u. Hence,
(pˆAfj )σ(l) ≥ (θ(pAfj ))u, (5)
and equality holds if and only if (p¯Afj )σ(l) = (θ(pAfj ))u = (pAfj )σ(l). We con-
clude from (3), (4) and (5) that
θ(pˆAfj ) L θ(pAfj ).
In the second case there exists an l ≤ u such that (θ(p¯Afj ))l = θ(pAfj ))l . Let v
be the smallest number such that (θ(p¯Afj ))v = θ(pAfj ))v . Assume without loss of
generality that θ(p¯Afj ) L θ(pAfj ). Then for all l < v: (p¯Afj )σ(l) = (pAfj )σ(l)
and hence (1) is true with d = σ(l). For all l ≥ v: (p¯Afj )σ(l) ≥ (θ(p¯Afj ))v >
(θ(pAfj ))v = (pAfj )σ(v). Hence, by inequality (2),
(θ(pˆAfj ))σ(l) > min{(p¯Afj )σ(l), (pAfj )σ(l)} > (θ(pAfj ))v.
It follows that θ(pˆAfj ) L θ(pAfj ). 
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Lemma 4.2 Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. Let p¯ be a protective
strategy for player 1 and let p ∈ m. Then, either p¯ and p are payoff equivalent for
player 1 or p¯ pro p.
Proof Suppose that p¯ and p are not payoff equivalent and that p¯ does not protectively
dominate p. Let α ∈ (0,1) and define pˆ := αp¯+ (1−α)p. It is shown below that the
strategy pˆ protectively dominates p¯, yielding a contradiction.
Because of our assumptions, there exists an l ∈ N such that
at (p¯) = at (p) and J t (p¯) = J t (p), for all t ∈ N, t < l, (6)
al(p¯) = al(p), J l(p¯) \ J l(p) = ∅ and J l(p) \ J l(p¯) = ∅. (7)
We first prove that for all j ∈ J t (p¯), with t < l it holds that p¯Afj = pAfj and
hence p¯Afj = pAfj = pˆAfj . Suppose not: pick the smallest t < l for which we
can find j ∈ J t (p¯) = J t (p) such that p¯Afj = pAfj . Since j ∈ J t (p) = J t (p¯),
it holds that θ(pAfj ) = θ(p¯Afj ). It follows from Lemma 4.1 that θ(pˆAfj ) L
θ(p¯Afj ) = θ(pAfj ). Let k ∈ {1, . . . , n}\⋃t	=1 J 	(p¯). Then θ(p¯Afk) L at (p¯), and
θ(pAfk) L at (p) = at (p¯). Using Lemma 4.1 yields: θ(pˆAfk) L at (p¯). Clearly
for all u < t : au(pˆ) = au(p¯), and Ju(pˆ) = Ju(p¯) = Ju(p), furthermore at (pˆ) L
at (p¯) or at (pˆ) = at (p¯) and J t (pˆ) ⊂ J t (p¯) (since j ∈ J t (p¯), but j ∈ J t (pˆ)). We can
conclude that pˆ prot p¯, yielding a contradiction.
Secondly, it can be proved in the same way as above that for all j ∈ J l (p¯)∩J l (p)
it is true that p¯Afj = pAfj .
There are now two cases: J l(p¯) ∩ J l(p) = ∅ and J l(p¯) ∩ J l(p) = ∅. Assume
first that J l(p¯) ∩ J l(p) = ∅. Take j ∈ J l(p¯), then there is an u > l such that j ∈
Ju(p). Because of Lemma 4.1 θ(pˆAfj ) L θ(p¯Afj ) = al(p¯). Let j ∈ Ju(p¯), with
u > l. Then θ(p¯Afj ) L al(p¯) and θ(pAfj ) L al(p¯). Applying Lemma 4.1 gives
θ(pˆAfk) L al(p¯). We can conclude that
θ(pˆAfj ) L al(p¯), (8)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}\⋃l−1k=1 J k(p). Hence, al(pˆ) L al(p¯) and pˆ prot p¯.
Now assume J l(p¯) ∩ J l(p) = ∅. Then there is also a level of pˆ with the same
vector value, since for all j ∈ J l(p¯)∩J l(p) = ∅, it holds that θ(pˆAfj ) = θ(p¯Afj ) =
θ(pAfj ) = al(p¯). As we have seen before it follows from Lemma 4.1 that for all
j ∈ ⋃lt=1(J t (p¯) ∩ J t (p)):
θ(pˆAfj ) L al(p¯).
Hence al(pˆ) = al(p¯) and J l(pˆ)  J l(p¯). So pˆ prot p¯, establishing a contradic-
tion. 
Definition 4.2 Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. Let p, p¯ ∈ m. We
say that p¯ prudently dominates p, in notation, p¯ pru p, if there exists an l ∈ N such
that
(i) at1(p¯) = at1(p) and |J t (p¯)| = |J t (p)| for all t ∈ N, t < l,
(ii) al1(p¯) L al1(σ ) or both al1(σ¯ ) = al1(σ ) and |J l(p¯)| < |J l(p)|.
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A mixed strategy p ∈ m is called prudent for player 1 in  if there does not exist a
mixed strategy p¯ ∈ m such that p¯ pru p.
Notice that any prudent strategy is also protective, since if a strategy is protectively
dominated, it is also prudently dominated by the same strategy. The following lemma
proves the converse with the use of Lemma 4.2.
Lemma 4.3 In any multicriteria game, a mixed strategy for player 1 is protective if
and only if it is prudent.
Proof Let  = 〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. It remains to prove that any
protective strategy is also prudent. Let p ∈ m be a protective strategy and suppose
p is not a prudent strategy. Then, by definition, there exists a strategy p¯ such that
p¯ pru p. This means that p and p¯ are not payoff equivalent. By Lemma 4.2, p pro
p¯, from which it follows that p pru p¯. This is a contradiction. 
The following theorem guarantees the existence of a prudent (protective) strategy
combination in any two-person multicriteria game.
Theorem 4.1 Every multicriteria two-person game has at least one prudent strategy
combination.
Proof It suffices to prove the existence of a prudent strategy for player 1. Let  =
〈m,n,A,B〉 be a multicriteria game. Define the sets
M1 = {p ∈ m | a1(p) L a1(p¯) for every p¯ ∈ m
}
,
P 1 = {p ∈ M1 | |J 1(p)| ≤ |J 1(p¯)| for any p¯ ∈ M1},
and for every t > 1,
Mt = {p ∈ P t−1 | at (p) L at (p¯) for every p¯ ∈ P t−1
}
,
P t = {p ∈ Mt | |J t (p)| ≤ |J t (p¯)| for any p¯ ∈ Mt}.
It follows from the continuity of the function θ and the compactness of m that M1
and P 1 are nonempty compact sets.3 It follows by induction that Mt = ∅, P t = ∅
and compact for any t ∈ N. Moreover, for every p, p¯ ∈ Mt we have at1(p) = at1(p¯)
and for every p, p¯ ∈ P t it holds that al(p) = al(p¯) and |J l(p¯)| = |J l(p)|, for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Since player 2 has finitely many pure strategies, there exists a s ∈ N
such that for all p ∈ P s : ⋃sl=1 J l(p) = {1, . . . , n} and |J s(p)| > 0. Note that for all
l > s, P l = P s , al(p) = (∞, . . . ,∞) and J l(p) = ∅ for all p ∈ P l . By definition the
set P s is precisely the set of prudent strategies for player 1. 
In the following two examples the notion of protective strategy combinations is
illustrated in a zero-sum like environment. In the first example it is shown that in a
3In fact P 1 is a finite union of finite intersections of inverse images of compact sets, hence P 1 is compact
itself.
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game with a large set of equilibria protectiveness picks the intuitively logic strategic
combination. In the second example it is shown that a protective strategy combination
need not necessarily be a (Pareto) equilibrium.
Example 4.1 Consider the two-person multicriteria game (2,2,A,B), where B =
−A and
A =
((0, 1) (1, 0)
(1, 0) (0, 1)
)
.
The set of Pareto equilibria equals 2 × 2, so each strategy combination is an
equilibrium. Let p¯ = (p,1 − p), with p ∈ [0,1] be a strategy of player one. Then
θ(p¯Af1) = θ(p¯Af2) = (p,1 − p) if p ≤ 12 and θ(p¯Af1) = θ(p¯Af2) = (1 − p,p) if
p ≥ 12 . Hence for player one, only the strategy ( 12 , 12 ) is protective. Obviously, also
( 12 ,
1
2 ) is the only protective strategy of player 2.












Clearly, the only protective strategy of player one is e1. the only protective strategy
of player two is f1. The unique protective strategy combination (e1, f1) is not an
equilibrium, since player one can deviate to e2, achieving a higher payoff in both
criteria.
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